![]() If deterrence failed, the United States would not find itself automatically involved. If that is a slightly less certain guarantee of stability, it is a far better one from America’s standpoint. The internal struggles that pose the most serious threat to regional stability are beyond the reach of America, unless Washington is prepared to repeat its Vietnam experience several times over.Īs for the threats of real conflict-the two Koreas and China/Taiwan-America’s allies are capable of maintaining military forces necessary to deter war. troops in Okinawa or South Korea could do about it. And if it were, there is little a few thousand U.S. Even in the midst of economic crisis, however, Asia is not ready to plunge in the abyss. The vague specter of instability has replaced the demon of communism as America’s enemy. troops is necessary only for “the foreseeable future.” But if the end of the Cold War, the collapse of hegemonic communism, and the dramatic growth in the strength of friendly democratic and quasi-democratic states throughout the region aren’t enough to warrant meaningful change, what would be enough? The administration says the presence of U.S. It also endorses military ties with Laos and Mongolia, countries with no conceivable relevance to U.S. Naturally, DOD lauds such traditional alliances as those with Japan and South Korea. The Pentagon’s 1998 report envisions an American security interest in virtually every East Asian country. Secretary of Defense William Cohen admitted: “When I first took over, I said everything is on the table for review, except we are going to keep 100,000 people in the Asia-Pacific region-that is off the table.” In short, the Pentagon conducted a supposedly searching review that ignored the most important issue. The administration’s formal commitment to permanent, promiscuous intervention was preordained. The administration’s watchword, and that of the leading Republican presidential contenders, is simply more of everything. In November 1998 the Department of Defense (DOD) released an updated report that advanced the same outdated arguments. ![]() security policy in East Asia (the Nye Report) made the astonishing assertion that “the end of the Cold War has not diminished” the importance of any of America’s regional security commitments. Washington’s motto appears to be “what has ever been, must ever be.” policy looks very much as it did during the Cold War. Only North Korea constitutes a genuine security threat, but that totalitarian state, though odious, is no replacement for the threat once posed by the Soviet Union.Īlas, so far neither the Clinton administration nor Congress seems to have noticed these changes. Southeast Asia suffers from economic and political instability, but such problems threaten no one outside the immediate neighborhood. So far Beijing’s military renewal has been modest its posture has been assertive rather than aggressive-although its saber-rattling toward Taiwan remains of concern. In China, tough-minded communism has dissolved into a cynical excuse for incumbent officeholders to maintain power. The Soviet Union has disappeared, and a much weaker Russia has neither the capability nor the will for East Asian adventurism. After years of failure, countries like Thailand have grown significantly (despite their recent setbacks).Īt the same time, the environment has become more benign. South Korea dramatically outstrips communist North Korea on virtually every measure of national power. Taiwan’s dramatic jump from poverty to prosperity encouraged the leaders of the communist mainland to undertake fundamental economic reforms. Japan is now the world’s second-ranking economic power. For five decades Washington provided a defense shield behind which noncommunist countries throughout East Asia grew economically and democratically. taxpayers spent roughly $13 trillion (in current dollars) and sacrificed 113,000 lives (mostly in East Asian wars) to win the Cold War. Rather than enhancing security ties when threats against the United States have dramatically diminished, Washington should initiate a phased withdrawal of American forces from the region. Indeed, the administration is presently expanding America’s military presence in East Asia. ![]() ![]() Washington policymakers seem determined to keep at least 100,000 military personnel in the region, apparently forever. The Cold War ended a decade ago, but America’s defense posture has changed little, especially in East Asia. Doug Bandow, a nationally syndicated columnist, is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and the author and editor of several books, including Tripwire: Korea and U.S.
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